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‘“Demo” and “cracy”’: music, trust, and
authentication in Mexico’s 2018 elections
Andrew Green
School of Culture and Creative Arts, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
ABSTRACT
Taking as its focal point the Mexican national elections of 2018, this article
explores how music, often circulated in the form of online videos, has
responded to low political trust in an emerging multiparty system. It explores
home-made videos made to foment trust in the election’s eventual victor,
and a project funded by the National Electoral Institute (INE) to use rap to
facilitate informed participation in the elections. It engages with the literature
on musical ‘authenticity’ to discuss what it explores as two forms of musical
‘authentication’: one personal, which authenticates or vouch for individual
political leaders, and another systemic, looking to foment legitimacy by
supporting voters’ ability to verify political claims. This article thus
contributes to the understanding of political systems undergoing democratic
transitions, arguing for attention to democratization as an affective, creative,
and multiple process.
KEYWORDS Elections; democracy; trust; music; citizenship; affect
The anxieties about democracy accompanying the illiberal turn in world poli-
tics have seen the re-emergence of discourses restating the importance of
classical liberal models of rationality for democratic functioning (Runciman
2017, Sunstein 2017). In these debates the role of musical or sonic creativity
is ambivalent at best; for instance, historian Timothy Snyder, in a widely read
guide to resisting tyrannical governments, emphasizes the value of literature
and print media for democratic participation while associating authoritarian
mindsets with ‘shamanistic incantation’ (2017, pp. 60–80). In turn, the voices
of these scholars conflict with research showing how affect and emotion,
often mediated by music, permeate political life (e.g. van Zoonen 2005,
Papacharissi 2015). While plenty of recent scholarship engages the intersec-
tion of music, democracy and citizenship (Adlington 2019), scholars of
music have done comparatively little work on the musical worlds of the
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most important events for the functioning of democracies – elections –
especially in recently established democratic systems.
This article examines the campaign song made for the Mexican national
elections of 2018, which ended in a victory for the anti-establishment candi-
date Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to as AMLO). These
elections were marked by low trust in political candidates and the widespread
sharing of so-called fake news. Equally, music played a prominent role during
these elections, and was the subject of frequent comment in the broadcast
and print media. In contemporary Mexico the activity of electoral democracy
is, as one musician put it to me, characterized by ‘noise, commotion [escán-
dalo] and partying’.1 Music is used as entertainment at political rallies, to
provide information to voters, and to vouch for candidates’ honesty. This
has effects on musical livelihoods: democracy in Mexico has long been
costly (Lomnitz-Adler 2001, p. 78) and elections constitute a periodic
source of income for many musicians. The prevalence of campaign song
raised questions about the ‘commensurability’ (Spielman 2019) of the demo-
cratic process in Mexico. Campaign song could be understood as a culturally
specific feature of Mexican democracy – although cultures of campaign song
are, in fact, witnessed in new or fragile democracies throughout the world
(e.g. Averill 1997, Shepler 2010).2 Most significant, campaign song could be
bemoaned as a marker of low democratic development and of a paucity of
deliberative dialogue; a sign, as one television commentator put it, that the
campaigns were ‘in diapers’.3
It is the latter point that I take up here: this article is written in response to
anxieties about campaign song, especially among Mexico’s wealthier classes,
which take democracy and democratic participation as a standardized set of
practices and idioms, implicitly associated with notions of Western moder-
nity. These anxieties do not allow for democratization as a plural, open-
ended process, marked by multiple, culturally embedded ‘affective literacies’
(Tadiar 2009). Grounded in ethnographic research with musicians, however,
this article aims to understand music within Mexican electoral politics,
rather than as a threat to, or distraction from, it; and to draw attention to
the experiences and contributions of a marginalized group of creative
workers. To do this, I link the affordances of music used during these elections
to the layered problems of low political trust.
Trust and authentication
I adapt one thread within popular music studies to the study of music and
elections: that of ‘authenticity’. Authenticity has been the subject of many
studies by popular music scholars, who characterize it as a fluid notion con-
stantly renegotiated in the texts of popular music (e.g. Peterson 2013). In turn,
Moore (2002) has foregrounded ‘authentication’, a term which decentres the
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focus away frommusicians, and draws attention to audiences’ practices of lis-
tening to music. Understood in this way, authenticity may consist of the sense
of the performer’s integrity, a feeling that performances are honest to the
experience of the listener, or the notion that a performance is faithful to a
given musical tradition. Here, I connect the first and second definitions –
which Moore labels third- and first-person authenticity respectively – to the
business of electoral politics. Exploring the multiple semantic pathways of
the term ‘authentication’ may prove especially productive, since we may
also speak of authentication in relation to claims to fact. To authenticate is
to assure that something, or someone, is reliable or trustworthy, meaning
that musical and political authentication may overlap (Behr 2015, p. 2,
Redhead and Street 1989, pp. 177–178).
‘Authentication’ may thus articulate cultural studies to a core current
debate: the relationship between democracies, trust, and truth. Where scho-
lars writing before the illiberal turn could juxtapose tyrannically imposed
‘official truths’ with pluralistic, subjective experience (e.g. Kitcher 2004),
liberal historians and political commentators see a lack of concern for truth
as a condition for totalitarian rule, undermining means by which power
may be held accountable (Runciman 2017, Snyder 2017, Sunstein 2017,
pp. 41–48). In turn, knowledge attains social value to the extent that we
trust that it will (Schütz 1946). Yet trust is difficult to define; scholars have
characterized it variously as an attitude or ‘belief that individuals hold
about other individuals’ likely actions’ (Cleary and Stokes 2006, p. 17), a
resource with economic value (Fukuyama 1995), or a strategy for dealing
with uncertainty (Sztompka 1999, p. 25). The development of quantitative
means to measure trust has allowed political scientists to model its relation-
ship to political systems.4 Nevertheless, the relationship between democra-
cies and trust resists measurement; it is complex and counter-intuitive.
Democratic concepts such as accountability institutionalize distrust for
those in power (Sztompka 1999, p. 140);5 further, there is a fine line
between trust and corruption (Morris and Klesner 2010). Tilly (2005) argues
that the ways that relational ‘trust networks’ – formed by sets of strong ties
through which participants access resources and organize risky, long-term
projects (4) – become integrated into public politics are vital for the emer-
gence of democracies. Democratization, Tilly highlights, has both driven
and required the integration of trust networks across many contexts (124,
136). The integration of trust networks shows that personal and political
trust are not easily extricated from one another.
If, as Tilly supposes, trust is a condition of relationships, it is intuitive to
study the intimate and affective life of trust (cf. Engdahl and Lidskog 2014,
p. 714, Hosking 2014, p. 2). It is also evident that trust is both culturally
embedded and aesthetically expressed. Yet where this topic has received
very little attention within cultural studies, the notions of authenticity and
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authentication as discussed by popular music scholars provide ways to
engage this discipline with questions of political trust. To do so is to recognize
trust as complex, dependent on the matrix of socially negotiated meanings
often taken as ‘culture’, on processes of reception by which people come
to associate trust with certain forms of expression, and on the specific affor-
dances presented by distinct musical genres. It is, in Frith’s words, to trace
‘how [music] sets up the idea of “truth” in the first place’ (1987, p. 36).
This article shows how music presents resources for ‘authentication’ upon
which electoral politics may draw. I hear the music accompanying Mexico’s
2018 elections in the context of the low legitimacy of Mexico’s political
system (Secretaria de Gobernación 2013, p. 28), tied to declining support
for democracy itself, and crises of political trust within new democracies in
general (Catterberg and Moreno 2006, Meyer 2017, p. 55). Processes of
authentication of music, I show, become simultaneously entangled with
authentication of candidates’ trustworthiness, and imbricated with trust in
Mexico’s political system. Above all, I am interested in exploring how emer-
gent musical languages of authentication dovetail with wider political dis-
course regarding trust.
I propose to explore what may be understood as two forms of musical
authentication: personal and systemic. The first rooted music’s role in the
fomentation of personal relations of trust with individual politicians; it
tended to invoke discrete affective literacies disseminated through music.
The second played an informational role aimed at facilitating the hearer to
participate in electoral politics, and implied democratization as a universaliz-
ing project. My methodology here is pragmatic, based on fourteen in-depth
interviews with musicians and public relations professionals; cyber-ethnogra-
phy, drawing from data publicly available online; and textual analyses of
music videos created for political candidates. Although this combination of
methods does not allow the efficacy of musical interventions into political
campaigns to be judged, it does afford analysis on the level of culturally
embedded intentionality. I will begin by providing some context for the
use of music in Mexico’s elections.
Music, electoral politics, and transition
The 2018 Mexican elections attracted deep anxieties to do with trust, legiti-
macy and truth. Writing in Proceso three weeks prior to the election, journalist
Héctor Tajonar condemned the ‘dictatorship of propaganda’ which was ‘not
interested in the veracity of their information’ but was instead ‘directed at the
emotions, not the intelligence’. Tajonar lamented that the ‘low level of
Mexican democracy’ rendered the country ‘fragile and manipulable’, for
which the only antidote was ‘reasoned and critical analysis’.6 Other writers
in the same magazine, Ana Cristina Ruelas and Ricardo Reyes, emphasized
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the role of an ‘informed society’ in holding government to account, and
argued that ‘in Mexico we’ve become accustomed to a State that administers
the information’ via government public relations spending and media depen-
dence on state funding, both legacies of single-party rule.7 These arguments
indexed both real histories of authoritarianism in Mexico, and the elusive
Enlightenment figure of the rational, disinterested, information-driven
citizen, simultaneously idealized, desirable, unattainable and othered. As
Lomnitz points out, this othering is rooted in racist notions of national infer-
iority, often echoed in everyday parlance describing Mexico as a ‘third-world
country’, but most typically perpetuated by elite voices standing in for ‘silent
Mexico’ (2001: xvii–xviii).
As it turned out, Enlightenment nostalgia defied electoral reality. The
eventual winner of the election, AMLO built his campaign around the
promise that he would ‘end corruption’, alongside the assertion that he
was the only trustworthy presidential candidate (Hanrahan and Aroch Fugel-
lie 2019). Often described as a left populist, the candidate’s campaign was
built around the idea that he had previously been the victim of electoral
fraud, in 2006 and 2012, when he had led the center-Left Party of the Demo-
cratic Revolution (PRD).8 Within AMLO’s discourse, he and his party, Morena (a
portmanteau of Movement of National Regeneration), were opposed by a
deceitful ‘mafia of power’. This phrase provided the candidate with an ideal
defense against media onslaughts; other candidates, along with most print
media and television outlets, labelled AMLO a ‘danger for Mexico’ and
drew comparisons with authoritarian Venezuelan president Nicolas
Maduro.9 AMLO responded by labelling these attacks as a guerra sucia
(‘dirty war’), thus linking them to the repressive governments of the 1960s
and 1970s (Calderón and Cedillo 2012).
AMLO thus succeeded in portraying himself as an insurgent, anti-establish-
ment candidate in a context of low trust in Mexican political institutions
(Greene and Sánchez-Talanquer 2018). In the twentieth century, single-
party rule under the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party) was ensured by
practices maintaining the illusion of democracy, such as vote-buying, cliente-
lism, corruption, and influence over the press (Schedler 2005, Tuckman 2012).
These practices continue in the present, as Mexico’s ongoing transition to
multiparty democracy since the late twentieth century has involved new
parties in the techniques of maintaining power established by the PRI
(Hilgers 2008). According to one study, 5 million votes were bought in the
2018 elections, mostly on behalf of the established parties PRI, right-wing
PAN (National Action Party) and centre-left PRD (Party of the Democratic
Revolution),10 and one-third of the electorate had been approached about
vote-buying.11 The 2018 elections also saw a wave of so-called fake news
in Mexico, mostly targeted against AMLO and Morena.12 There was a continu-
ity between these practices and those of the previous national election in
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2012, when bots supporting the PRI flooded Twitter (Pomerantsev 2019,
pp. 70–81).
The 2018 presidential election, then, combined long-standing and novel
strategies for electoral success; but it was also unusual in its focus on a
single political personality.13 In turn, the fact that AMLO’s campaign was con-
structed around a sense of personal authenticity created an important role for
popular music. On 13 June 2018 Belinda, a high-profile Mexican singer and
actor, released a music video covering ‘Mexico Lindo Y Querido’ dedicated
to AMLO. Originally written by Chucho Monge, the song is a paean to
Mexico in which the nation is narrated in the informal second person (‘I
sing to your volcanos, to your meadows and flowers, which are as talis-
mans of the love of my loves’). Belinda’s delivery plays on the intimacy
of these lyrics; her voice often cracks at the moment of producing
sound, and she ends several lines with a diminuendo in which vocal pro-
duction is overtaken by the sound of breathing. This intimate effect is
enhanced by the sparse orchestration; where well-known versions of this
song, such as that sung by Golden Age star Jorge Negrete, are
accompanied by a full mariachi ensemble, Belinda is accompanied by a
single tenor stringed instrument (not displayed in the video, but likely
either a ukulele or a jarana). A series of calls to action appear in the
video, such as ‘If you don’t dream today, when? If you don’t make the
difference, who will?’ and ‘Faced with fear, the homeland [patria] calls us
to love’ – a phrase which both implicitly critiques what AMLO had labelled
the campaign guerra sucia and recalls the Morena campaign slogan ‘Peace
and Love’. Indeed, the whole video places footage recalling Mexico – such
as a woman standing in Mexico City’s Zócalo and a man walking barefoot
along a rural path – underneath the word ‘Love’, which is revealed at the
end of the video as the camera slowly zooms out, followed by the cam-
paign slogan ‘AMLO 2018’. Towards the end, the video reveals three
shots of AMLO: two with his wife, Beatriz Gutierrez, the first as they walk
in an embrace along the side of a motorway and the second as they
gently touch foreheads, smiling, in a recording studio; and footage of
AMLO standing on a beach, embracing the pair’s youngest son, looking
down into his eyes and kissing him on the forehead.
Belinda’s video has been liked over 25,000 times on Twitter, and has been
retweeted almost 11,000 times.14 In key ways, it aligns with the strategy
pursued by Morena during the 2018 elections, especially as it decries an
anti-AMLO campaign of fear and proposes ‘love’ instead. Yet this video was
also personal and emotional in intent: it linked first- and second-person auth-
enticity (Moore 2002), closely connected with popular music in and beyond
Mexico, with the familial intimacy of AMLO’s personal life. Such a connection
builds on specifically Mexican histories: it is facilitated by the historical perso-
nalization of the post-revolutionary state in Mexico, mediated through songs
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like ‘Mexico Lindo Y Querido’ (Velázquez and Vaughan 2006, pp. 112–113). In
the terms of Martin Stokes, it presents an ‘impossible love’ (2010, p. 69)
between citizen and leader; the search for justice is musically and visually
identified as fragile, in need of protection.
By contrast, competing political parties’ musical efforts were occasionally
criticized for a lack of first-person authenticity. A campaign advert circulated
on national television in March 2018 by the ruling PRI featured groups of
actors enthusiastically singing an upbeat, anthemic soft rock song in states
across Mexico (‘We are pride, we are colors, we are the people, there are
millions of us/we are your shield, we are passion/with the flag in our
hearts’) and concludes by showing the phrase ‘The pride of the PRI is in its
people’.15 The video was panned by Milenio commentator Álvaro Cueva for
featuring actors instead of real party activists: ‘the result, far from being a
song of authentic joy, is a hymn to falsehood, to something that doesn’t
exist […] This advert is weird, it says things that aren’t true’.16 Cueva’s critique
targeted an especially damaging ambiguity: the highly unpopular PRI incum-
bent, Enrique Peña Nieto, had long been criticized for having a false, polished
persona (Hanrahan and Aroch Fugellie 2019, p. 125). It pointed towards
authentication’s multiple temporal layers; ways in which present authentica-
tion processes were dependent on the affective legacies of the past.
As Cueva’s negative response suggests, while it sought to accumulate and
transmit authenticity, campaign music could also attract suspicion and
scandal. The most effective way to counter a campaign song was to question
the integrity of its author; correspondingly, social media comments responding
to campaign songs frequently imputed that musicians had been paid large
sums to record them. Belinda herself was the target of a last-minute smear cam-
paign: as she performed in so-called AMLOfest, a free-to-attend concert held to
close the Morena campaign in 87,000-seater stadium Estadio Azteca, fabricated
receipts circulated online purporting to show that she had charged the Morena
campaign 42 million pesos (roughly 2 million US dollars) for her appearance.17
Equally, genuine intrigue frequently arose around the financing of campaign
song. One of the most-shared pro-Morena songs in the 2018 campaign, ‘La
Niña Bien’, was presented as university coursework and accompanied by a
video partly filmed in a church; it was soon discovered that the video’s protago-
nist did not exist, that the leaders of the church in question were unaware that a
political video was being filmed there, and that the source of themoney used to
shoot the video was unknown.18 Ultimately, the chapel priest suggested that
the video be investigated for violating electoral law.19
In addition to the financial confusion, the video’s online circulation made
its authors difficult to trace; it had first been placed on Facebook, before
being uploaded onto YouTube by a user with no apparent connections to
the production team. Yet this was typical for campaign songs in Mexico,
which were often circulated anonymously online on multiple accounts, and
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often subsequently deleted. Several songs falsely purporting to be by famous
artists were created for the 2018 campaign, including a pro-Morena song
uploaded to YouTube under the name of the norteña group Banda MS,
which altered the lyrics to the group’s love song ‘Piénsalo’. The group
responded in a statement to the magazine hey! that they ‘do not belong
to, nor support, any political party […] [Banda MS] distances itself from the
use being made of one of our songs’.20 Another recording uploaded to
YouTube claimed to show Mexican pop icon Juan Gabriel dedicating his
1980 hit song ‘El Noa Noa’ to Morena, when in reality the singer had built
his career around support for the PRI under single-party rule, and in any
case had passed away in 2016.21 The recording was sung by an impersonator,
who changed the chorus ‘Let’s go to the Noa Noa, let’s go to dance’ to ‘Let’s
go with Morena, I’ll vote for Morena’. In this context, the line between satire
and reality was easily crossed; these fakes could be passed off as humorous in
intent, but they were taken seriously by many YouTube commenters.
Campaign songs thus had a troublesome relationship to authentication:
although these songs sought to foment personal trust in politicians, they fre-
quently themselves became a focus of suspicion of the Mexican political
system. In turn, as explored in the following section, this mistrust reflected
the harsh economic realities of musicianship in Mexico, as musicians creating
campaign music looked to negotiate politically divisive terrain while retaining
their audiences.
Musicking electoral politics
During the campaign I conducted research with several artists who had
written campaign songs, seeking to understand their motivations and how
these songs complemented their broader livelihoods. I also interviewed
several workers at a public relations agency hired to produce music videos
for the 2018 campaign. Each of the musicians I interviewed supported
Morena and AMLO, although one had been paid to write a song for a candi-
date for the incumbent PRI. These artists formed part of a vast group of
‘hidden musicians’ (Finnegan 1989) whose typical anonymity tended to
reflect economic and political insecurity. Each made music as a source of
income, although some drew their main livelihoods from other lines of
work. They combined campaign songwriting with other musical activities,
such as performing at dances. Felt freedoms of expression were influenced
by location: while some musicians received death threats after publishing
campaign songs, the musicians I spoke to who lived in the United States
told me that they felt safer to write pro-Morena songs there than in
Mexico, whose political system was corrupted by drug cartels.
The political imbalance among the musicians I spoke to reflected two
things: first, as recognized by journalist Roberto Ponce, there was a
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genuine groundswell of user-generated songs supporting Morena which
reflected the party’s widespread popularity. Second, artists who had
written songs for the establishment parties (that is, the PRI, the PAN and
the PRD) were both more likely to have been paid to do so, and more
likely to mention this fact. As I was told by members of agencies hired by pol-
itical parties to create campaign promotional material for the 2018 elections,
Morena solicited promotional material that looked home-made, partly as a
demonstration of popular support, and partly to distance themselves from
the polished image of the established parties. Specifically, Morena asked
for music that employed colloquial language, and even requested that
agencies reduce the audio and image quality on music videos made to
promote their campaign (although, agency workers told me, this did not
reduce their fee). The clearest overall effect was to obstruct efforts to dis-
tinguish popular and professional support for the party. Such paid-for but
home-spun efforts, however, may also have inspired and validated genuine
pro bono musical support for Morena. While it is difficult to map the
economy of campaign musicianship in Mexico, it is worth noting that
Morena’s official campaign expenditure was about a quarter of that spent
by the largest mainstream parties (the PAN and the PRI).22 On the surface,
qualitative observations that pro-Morena songs were written pro bono
align with quantitative campaign spending trends – although it may also,
as suspected by some, suggest undeclared campaign spending.
All of the musicians I spoke to told me that they had written pro-Morena
songs out of personal conviction, rather than being paid to do so. While some
were long-standing supporters of AMLO, others had begun to support him
only recently. One told me that, having been previously apolitical, he had
fallen ill during the election campaign and noticed AMLO trending on
Twitter; subsequently, he became a supporter and wrote a song celebrating
the candidate. Several respondents painted a narrative of Damascene conver-
sion, in which previously apolitical musicians became aware of corruption in
Mexico, and were inspired to become politically engaged by the charismatic,
authentic figure of AMLO. Yet respondents also told of desperation and dis-
illusionment in Mexican politics, and painted AMLO as morally detached from
the corrupt political mainstream. For these individuals AMLO was synon-
ymous with democracy, and thus with hope – reflecting the candidate’s
repeated mid-campaign declarations that ‘we are constructing a democracy’.
Equally, these musicians’ profiles could benefit from writing campaign
songs. Shared on YouTube and Facebook, their pro-Morena music videos
generally reached a far wider audience than their other songs, and garnered
a vociferously positive reaction from online commenters. Some respondents
had been invited to perform at Morena events after creating campaign songs.
Jonathan Higuera, a full-time performer of música regional and música
norteña from Sinaloa, was excited to have met AMLO at a local rally and to
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have passed the candidate a CD of his music. Support for AMLO and Morena
was often connected to the hardship linked to professional musicianship in
Mexico. For instance, the members of Hidalgo-based group Samperio Show
directly related their long-standing support for AMLO to their experiences
working in music. Band leader Luis told me about the frustrating and econ-
omically challenging experience of making a living from music in Hidalgo;
he blamed corruption and, in particular, the PRI’s longstanding governance
of the state.
This economic hardship necessitated a great deal of creative flexibility.
Samperio Show, for instance, was a banda versátil (‘versatile band’): a group
whose repertoire covered diverse genres including música norteña, cumbia,
salsa, and tropical. Versatility opened up a greater number of performance
opportunities, and constituted a wider ethic of musicianship for these
bands: in order to survive groups had to respond flexibly to high and low
‘seasons’ for music, present a flexible economic model (including lower
prices for smaller ensembles) to attract the custom of both well-off and
poorer clients, and be able to play their songs for audiences of any back-
ground. But such flexibility also manifested, for many musicians, in a need
to include or exclude political content, depending on audiences. Jonathan
Higuera, who fronted and composed for the norteña group Jonathan
Higuera Y Su Estado Mayor, had a similar attitude to live events to that of
Samperio Show (saying that ‘wherever they ask us, we go’); his band could
perform in a variety of genres, such as cumbia and norteña, and they also
managed the music market astutely by varying prices for different locations,
spaces and audiences. While Jonathan’s pro-Morena corrido23 ‘Ya Sabes
Quien’ received almost a million views on YouTube, the singer only per-
formed this song on request, or to audiences he knew to support the
party: ‘I play my music […] I can’t be singing propaganda for someone
who isn’t paying me to do so’. Jonathan made most of his living by playing
live at fiestas, where he felt that political discourse within music was inap-
propriate: ‘the music I play is to distract people from the problems they
have. People go to dances [bailes] to forget their problems’.
Comparatively few of the pro-Morena songs written by these musicians
contained information relating to policy. The one exception was Samperio
Show, which wrote both a song dedicated to AMLO and one promoting
the Morena candidate to represent Hidalgo in the national Senate, Julio
Menchaca Salazar. Band percussionist and composer Luis, who also worked
as a trader, saw music as an ideal shared language through which to
ensure that people ‘knew and understood what [AMLO] represented for
Mexico’. Samperio Show’s pro-Morena song was a cumbia24 built around
the call-and-response refrain ‘With López Obrador (for a better Mexico)/
With López Obrador (we’re going to live better)’. The song’s second verse
seeks to inform the listener of Morena’s policy proposals:
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Que te alcance pa’ comer (con López Obrador) You’ll have enough to eat (with López Obrador)
Gasolina mas barata (con…) Cheaper gasoline (with…)
Escuela pa’ tus hijos (con…) School for your children (with…)
Pagar menos impuestos (con…) Pay lower taxes (with…)
Basta ya de corrupción (con…) An end to corruption (with…)
Doctor es inmediato (con…) See a doctor straight away (with…)
Medicinas al instante (con…) Instant medicine (with…)
These lyrics closely echo Morena supporters’ grievances against the political
establishment: first, the 2017 ‘gasolinazo’, which saw gasoline prices rise dra-
matically after the PRI government removed price controls, leading to mass
protests; second, the high corruption in Mexico, which AMLO promised to
reduce. Equally, the first verse of Samperio Show’s cumbia takes a different
approach, vouching for the candidate’s trustworthiness: ‘Decent, honest,
and transparent man, is López Obrador […] integrity and values: he always
carries them with him’.
Most other songs by the musicians I researched took the person-focused
approach of this cumbia’s first verse, rather than the policy-driven approach
of its second. For instance, the song ‘Canción Para AMLO’ was written and
performed by Perla Ramos, a musician based in Texas. A mother of three chil-
dren, Perla had been a full-time musician for 22 years, and had written many
songs for political parties. Historically, her voting record was conservative;
from the north of the country, she had previously been a supporter of the
PAN, but came to reject the Mexican political establishment, especially with
the worsening impact of the war on drugs. To Perla, AMLO stood out as an
anti-establishment politician who would offer an alternative to the failing
status quo: ‘The strategies of the PRI and the PAN haven’t been enough, so
there must be another strategy to follow’. Equally, Perla felt that AMLO was
a uniquely trustworthy figure. The trust she placed in AMLO was expressed
in her musicianship, through a pro-Morena song that deployed familiar
forms of popular music authenticity. While the songs she had been paid to
write for other political parties looked to ‘identify the candidate and their
(policy) proposals well’, ‘Canción Para AMLO’ was published on YouTube in
early April 2018, and was written out of a ‘feeling of citizenship, not
because a candidate paid me to promote them and say nice things about
them’.
The creative process for ‘Canción Para AMLO’ was indicative of how musi-
cians writing songs for political parties frequently had to manage anonymity.
The song’s lyrics were authored by an individual known to Perla, who wished
to remain anonymous for political reasons. These lyrics were then edited by a
journalist from Reynosa,25 and Perla wrote and recorded the music in Texas.
Initially, the song was written as a corrido, and the lyrics contain common fea-
tures of corridos such as the singer’s farewell formula (‘I’m going, I’m saying
goodbye, there’s no time to lose’) and octosyllabism (McDowell 2000).
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Nonetheless, Perla chose not to arrange the lyrics as a corrido, classifying her
song instead as son huasteco.26
Despite the collaborative and mobile way that ‘Canción Para AMLO’ was
composed, the song’s lyrical content, performance style, and accompanying
video emphasized a direct, personal relationship with the political candidate
it supported. The song opens with a pessimistic image based on the animals
depicted on the Mexican national flag (‘The eagles here are eaten up by the
snakes’; indeed, in the YouTube video for the song this lyric is accompanied
by footage of a struggle between an eagle and a snake). In response, the song
suggests that ‘upon eradicating the rotten/the joy will return’, simultaneously
locating the target as corruption (that is, ‘rot’) and positioning the stakes of
this political struggle as inherently affective. These lyrics are accompanied
by close-up images of voters at political rallies whose concerned, disap-
pointed faces stand in for that of the viewer. At the song’s chorus, roughly
halfway through the video, there is a shift of tense from a general description
of Mexico’s problems to direct experience, as the figure of AMLO, narrated in
the informal second person ‘tú’, is presented: ‘To you [a tí] Lopez Obrador, I
dedicate this song’. This first- to second-person dynamic continues for the
next few lines, when Perla sings:
Dejaré de ser cautivo, I will no longer be captive
En ti brilla la esperanza In you, hope shines
veo que tu proyecto avanza, I see your project move forward
y eso me mantiene vivo And that keeps me alive
The sense of hope inspired by AMLO’s campaign is narrated in the second
person, constructing a strong sense of intimacy between the singer – who
stands in for the hearer – and the candidate. It is also conditional on the exclu-
sion of the ‘rotten’ establishment. The effect is to present politics as com-
plexly inter-subjective, foregrounding the affectively textured individual
relationship to politics, mediated through the figure of AMLO.
These intimate affects are reinforced by Perla’s performance style – she
sings without accompaniment, and frequently constricts her throat in the
act of vocalizing. They are also mediated by genre; the song’s range of
affective possibilities results from the singer’s decision to adapt lyrics initially
written in a corrido form for a son huasteco piece. With an arrangement
including two acoustic guitars, bass guitar, and contralto flute, ‘Canción
Para AMLO’ is constructed around a son huasteco rhythm shifting between
groups of three-time and two-time bars in which the first downstroke on
rhythm guitar is muted with the palm, while the other guitar and the flute
perform requinto (solo) roles. Both its harmonic backing, written in a minor
key and featuring consecutive major chords a semitone apart, and its vocal
style, containing several leaps between chest and falsetto voices, also recall
son huasteco. By contrast, corridos are, with very few exceptions, set in a
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major key and typically limited to the tonic, dominant and subdominant.
While corridos typically contain linear narratives told by disinterested narra-
tors which are valued for their accuracy and objectivity (McDowell 2000,
pp. 62–64), son huasteco tends to engage more explicitly with emotional
human experience. The son huasteco genre thus presents a different set of
affordances for performing intimacy which are exploited within ‘Canción
Para AMLO’.
By the time of the election, Perla’s song had attracted just over 20,000
views and almost a hundred YouTube comments – more than any other
videos the singer has uploaded to the website. Comments were vital for
authenticating the video and its political value; entirely supportive of the
singer and of Morena, they tended to combine praise of the song’s aesthetic
qualities with support for AMLO and broader patriotic sentiment. For
instance, one commenter described how the song ‘made my hair stand on
end’, another stated that ‘[t]his song moves me greatly, to tears and fills
me with pride’, and another wrote that ‘[a]ll the profound feeling of a
wounded people is a beautiful thing’. These comments made the political
both personal and affective; in the words of Moore (2002, p. 219), they ‘trans-
ferred’ individually authenticated experience ‘to a situation whereby others
are allotted the same vividness of experience such that their actions
ground the first individual’s security’.
In turn, there is a marked difference between the style of ‘Canción Para
AMLO’ and that of another campaign song written by Perla, this time for
Gustavo Rico de Saro, a PRI candidate running in Reynosa, Sinaloa for the
national Chamber of Deputies. Perla’s approach to this song was different
from the beginning. Since Perla ‘didn’t want to speak well of [him] because
[he] told me he was [nice]’ she ‘sat down with him […] checked his proposals,
spoke to him to get to know him, and asked others’ opinions of him’. Over a
cumbia rhythm intended to be ‘joyful, loud [and] appealing’, Perla sings in
harmony, introducing the PRI candidate in the third person. Many of the
lyrics address the same issues of trust to which pro-AMLO songs responded;
this politician is positioned as a change candidate, described as ‘a man who,
being dependable, will give us a hand/a man of work, who likes challenges
[…] we don’t need pure words, [others] only promise’. These sentiments
accompany information about the candidate’s name and district, and the
date of the vote. The result was an official campaign song intended to identify
the candidate in political adverts and at campaign events.
Perla’s pro-PRI song contrasts strongly with ‘Canción para AMLO’; where
the latter is intimate, direct and personal, the former is impersonal, indirect
and to a greater degree informational. Indeed, real-life trust relations were
inverted in the creative process for these two songs: while a politician the
singer met with in person is vouched for indirectly and tepidly, the object
of the more intimate song, AMLO, is a figure the singer has never met. This
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contrast highlights a consistent feature of pro-Morena songs in the 2018 elec-
tion: they constructed political trust as a correlate of personal qualities attrib-
uted to individual candidates, in opposition to the legitimacy of Mexico’s
political system. Political trust is also, however, here aestheticized and med-
iatized; narrated through the discrete affordances of musical genre. In the fol-
lowing section I examine a contrasting project which, using a more
transnationally legible genre, highlighted a role for music both in communi-
cating information about democratic operations, and in representing insti-
tutions for electoral governance.
Hip hop at the National Electoral Institute
In May 2018 twoMexico City-based rappers, Ximbo and Danger, were hired to
work on behalf of Mexico’s National Electoral Institute (INE). INE had been
created as the remit of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was expanded to
include municipal and state elections in 2014. On its website the Institute’s
aims are described as ‘to strengthen electoral democracy and guarantee
the exercise of citizens’ political-electoral rights’;27 INE seeks to facilitate
free and fair elections in Mexico. In the 2018 campaign, INE’s remit extended
to informative projects; INE President Lorenzo Córdoba wrote in newspaper El
Universal a few days before the election that ‘a free vote is an informed
vote’.28 This focus reflected deep concerns about the rise of ‘fake news’, as
INE increasingly saw its role as ‘defending democracy from misinformation’.29
Ximbo and Danger were contracted to perform in a series of brief music
videos designed to facilitate engagement with the national electoral
debates. These videos, released on Twitter and on INE’s website, contained
raps of roughly fifteen seconds each which informed voters about the
topics covered during the second election debate, held on 20 May 2018 in
the Autonomous University of Baja California. Under the overall rubric of
‘Mexico in the world’ – the theme of this debate – the themes addressed
included borders, Donald Trump’s proposed border wall, repatriation,
human rights, migration, international trade, undocumented migrants,
exports, and remittances; each video featured black-and-white footage of
the rappers performing, followed by INE’s logo and the Twitter hashtag
#VotoLibre (‘free vote’). Twenty-three videos were published online, although
Ximbo and Danger had created more than twice this number in two days of
intensive recording. The videos were uploaded onto YouTube and Twitter,
although since their main purpose was to supplement the second electoral
debate, links to them appeared at appropriate points during the live coverage
of this debate on INE’s website.
For these videos, Ximbo told me, they sought to use straightforward, col-
loquial language ‘with a very simple flow and meter, so that people would
understand it […] it wasn’t a question of rapping really fast or anything
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too complex’. Writing in such a widely legible fashion meant eschewingmuch
of the linguistic playfulness common within hip hop creativity. The lyrics for
their video on ‘Democracy’, for example, are as follows:
Democracia significa que tu eliges
Que tu tienes el poder de escoger a quienes
dirigen
Demo y Cracia vienen del griego
Juntos forman la frase ‘el gobierno del pueblo’
Democracy means that you choose
That you have the power to elect those who rule
Demo and cracy come from Greek
Together they form the phrase ‘government of the
people’
As this example shows, writing simply could also mean refusing the critical
perspective on Mexican politics typical of the hip-hop scene, where national
democracy is often dismissed as a sham. We are presented here instead with
a minimalist, Schumpeterian definition of democracy as a process centred
upon periodic elections and the transfer of power.
Ximbo and Danger were high-profile and longstanding figures in Mexico’s
rap scene, and were active recording artists. By the time of my research the
pair were frequently performing together during live rap battles. Danger
was contacted first, by an agency with which he had collaborated while orga-
nizing a series of events featuring freestyle rap battles, themed rap ‘epic
battles’ featuring famous figures (such as Shakespeare and Cervantes), and
spoken-word poetry. The subsequent inclusion of Ximbo in the project,
both rappers told me, was partially motivated by the goal of achieving
equal gender representation. Both made their living from hip-hop; like the
other musicians interviewed as part of this study, then, engaging musical
creativity with electoral politics was incorporated into a wider portfolio
career requiring flexibility and adaptability. Nonetheless, neither had been
forced by economic necessity to participate, and both gave positive justifica-
tions for wanting to do so; Danger, for instance, saw value in the goal of using
rap ‘to communicate ideas that aren’t clear for people’. Yet Danger sup-
plemented this assessment with reasoning rooted in suspicion, stating that
if they chose not to participate, INE would hire ‘some less-well-known
rappers and coach them to do what they want’. ‘At least this way’, he con-
cluded, ‘we did what we wanted to do’.
Participating in this project highlighted the complexities of national and
international politics. Since, as Ximbo told me, ‘there were many themes
that neither of us were particularly clear about’, the pair had to conduct a sig-
nificant amount of research, including consulting the dictionary, conducting
online research, and taking advice from political scientists, legal scholars and
lawyers. Equally challenging was to fit this information into a brief four-line
rap. Many of these themes concerned technical, intricate, and consequential
organizational matters which the pair were expected to discuss in a disinter-
ested, accurate, representative way. This mode of writing was unusual within
the hip-hop scene, where creative engagement with political themes tended
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to be more polemical in intent; ‘I would have loved to have given more of my
own opinion’, Ximbo told me, ‘but it wasn’t like that – we had to be very
neutral’. Where campaign song tended to presume of musicians extra-ordin-
ary power to intuit public sentiments, using music to inform the public
caused these artists to express humility about the political role they could
play.
Dissatisfaction with the pressure to be ‘neutral’ responded to moments in
which representatives of INE intervened to ensure that their lyrics were not
overly targeted or critical. In one instance, in response to the theme
‘migrant rights’, Ximbo initially wrote that ‘they must be respected, and it’s
the government’s duty to see that they’re respected’. Nonetheless, others
on the project objected to these lyrics: ‘They asked me to change it […] to
say that it’s everyone’s duty, or to say something else, but not to say that
it’s the government’s duty.’ On another occasion, Ximbo performed lyrics
written by her collaborator about the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) which, to her frustration, failed to reflect the economic injustices
built into this treaty:
I had to say that NAFTA […] is for these three countries so that trade flows
better. And I was like, hold on. It’s much more complicated than that. And it
really screws over Mexico, obviously. And there wasn’t time to say that […] I
don’t know if [Danger] wanted to remain completely neutral and only say
what things are, but it’s just that behind that it’s much more important that
people can use their own judgement [criterio] and that they know what’s
going on beneath the surface. Because if I tell you ‘it’s a treaty to make trade
flow better’ that sounds good, no?
Such dissatisfaction is indicative of the broader contradictions of a ‘neutral’
INE more generally. As has been argued especially forcefully by feminist scho-
lars (e.g. Fraser 1990), claims for political neutrality tend to mask as much as
bracket difference, facilitating the perpetuation of unidentified inequalities of
power. Here, the notion of neutrality served to shield the governments of
Mexico and the United States from criticism, and inscribed the neoliberal
economic ideology accepted within mainstream Mexican political discourse
into ahistorical and context-free definitions. Ximbo’s dissatisfaction with
the pair’s NAFTA-themed rap not only relates to the limited information it
transmitted, but – echoing Freire’s (2006 [1970]) criticism of the so-called
‘banking model’ of education – to broader ways that the project sidelined
critical engagement in favour of constrained didacticism. She touches upon
a broader tension among politically engaged rappers in Mexico: whether to
use hip-hop principally to transmit relevant information, or to call people
to occupy a condition of active, engaged citizenship.
The project’s overall outcomes were difficult to judge. INE’s president
Lorenzo Córdoba credited its online strategy, ‘oriented towards youth audi-
ences’, for the high (36 million) online viewing figures for the debates.30
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Nonetheless, Ximbo and Danger reflected critically on the execution of
their project, drawing attention to technological setbacks: since their
videos only appeared in links embedded in the video of the debate on
INE’s website, viewers had to pause the debate to see them. Perhaps
most consequential was the response from the wider rap community in
Mexico City. Under a compilation of the pair’s INE videos on YouTube,
for instance, almost all comments are critical: some criticize the involve-
ment of hip hop with politics (one begging them to ‘keep hip hop far
away from this business’ and another decrying the pair’s entanglement
with the ‘INE circus’), while others contend that the project undermines
these rappers’ credibility within the hip-hop scene, one saying ‘If Danger
had put out this bullshit before his rap battle with Proof, Proof would
have ground him into the dirt’.31 Some of my research participants from
the hip-hop scene were even more damning: one, a long-standing
rapper from Estado de México’s underground scene, described the
project as an attempt ‘to legitimize a decaying and dishonest system’;32
another experienced rapper from Puebla characterized INE as ‘one of the
most corrupt institutions in Mexico’ and said that the pair should be
more ‘consistent with their principles’.33
This suspicious reception in their musical community was not lost on the
two rappers. Both had received positive messages from viewers online,
including from people saying that the pair’s videos had motivated them to
watch the debates. Yet the pair had also anticipated a critical response
prior to participating, Ximbo saying that ‘people in rap criticize a lot […] it
seemed to them that it was like selling ourselves to the Institute’. Indeed,
the pair responded publicly to criticism during an online interview about
the project with the newspaper El Universal. Towards the beginning of the
interview, after framing the project as a response to ‘political apathy’
among young people, Danger distanced himself from INE (‘it’s not to
support the government, not even INE’), and placed his participation in the
project in continuity with his other social projects. With INE, Danger said,
his goal was ‘to use a platform to carry out social communication’. He then
closed the interview with a freestyle rap responding to four keywords:
poverty, decisions, impuestos (meaning either ‘taxes’ or ‘impositions’) and
hypocrisy. His freestyle both condemned those in the hip-hop community
disparaging the pair’s work without acting themselves, and highlighted
INE’s distance from party politics, thus defending the pair from the accusation
of complicity with Mexico’s political system:
It’s about doing it, what we did with INE of course/but not with a political party,
because nothing was imposed on us […] It’s about doing things, whether well
or badly, but don’t fear looking stupid, brother (carnal)/and if you like to criti-
cize, we welcome your criticism/But we prefer actually doing things to mere
clicktivism (ser activista virtual).
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Danger’s ambivalence is understandable. INE has been repeatedly mired in
controversy, and has particular problems with legitimacy among young
people and those on the political Left (Ortega Ortíz and Somuano Ventura
2015). Public confidence in INE34 had fallen significantly since the 2006 elec-
tions when, despite evidence of electoral anomalies, the institution refused to
call a recount, and AMLO’s center-left coalition, which had narrowly lost,
refused to recognize the result (76–78). Meyer notes that after this point,
Mexico’s electoral institutions lost ‘much of their credibility, such that a
sector of the opposition simply does not accept them as legitimate insti-
tutions’ (2017, p. 319, see Morris and Klesner 2010, pp. 1277–1278). In
response, Ortega Ortíz and Somuano Ventura recommend addressing the
institution’s lack of trust among leftist groups by ‘strengthening channels
of communication’; and combating the mistrust in the organization among
young people through greater use of social media (2015, pp. 136–137). It
was reasonable to suspect that INE-funded programmes to stimulate engage-
ment with elections might be intended to bolster the legitimacy of the insti-
tution itself.
In turn, Ximbo and Danger’s views about INE were themselves ambivalent.
At points, both rappers defended their participation in the project by high-
lighting INE’s political neutrality. For instance, Danger told me that ‘its
budget comes from the government, but they have the capacity to take
decisions without consulting the government – well, without receiving
orders’. Nonetheless, he demonstrated skepticism about whether the organ-
ization was fulfilling its mission: ‘[INE] is charged with ensuring that elections
are fair and democratic […] Really I don’t know whether it is or not’. Danger
both acknowledged mistrust of the organization and expressed exasperation
with it: ‘everything INE does online receives criticism, no matter what it does.
If they publish something you’ll see lots of criticism of fraud from 6 and 12
years ago, although the same people no longer work for INE’. In a similar
vein, even as Ximbo emphasized INE’s ‘autonomy’, she concurred that it
suffered problems of legitimacy relating to credible suspicions of electoral
fraud. Her criticisms dovetailed with broader cynicism about Mexico’s politi-
cal system, a long-standing conviction not to vote, and a self-identification as
an anarchist.
On the surface, then, INE’s hip-hop project presented a strong contrast to
the user-generated pro-Morena songs discussed above, which aestheticized
and dramatized trust at an individual and inter-subjective level. Ximbo and
Danger’s project sought to facilitate more inclusive participation in electoral
politics by aiding voters – especially those from disenfranchized groups – to
authenticate the claims made by politicians. Yet the choice of hip-hop did
more than engage a disengaged youth demographic: as both a transnational,
highly commensurable genre and one rooted in language, hip-hop pointed
towards a classical liberal account of the universal affects of deliberative,
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rational democracy. Even the stripped-down, restrained beats used for this
project could be heard as affectively ‘neutral’.
It was evident, however, that the gesture behind the project towards dis-
interested, institutional legitimacy extended only inconsistently to these
rappers themselves. Political and personal trust were not so easily separated
(Morris and Klesner 2010, p. 1262); through participating in this project,
Ximbo and Danger were subject to personal criticism, swept into the
complex, pre-existing vortices of trust and mistrust that had already coa-
lesced around INE, and confronted with the conflicting utopias and realities
concerning the institution’s status as a neutral arbiter of electoral affairs. It
became clear that the interpretive line dividing a well-meaning attempt to
facilitate participation in electoral politics from a self-interested attempt by
INE to gain legitimacy was a thin one, which reflected the goodwill already
afforded to the organization. Criticism of the project suggested a Janus-
faced dynamic of authentication; where the credibility of the pair led some
to engage more with the electoral debates, the mistrust of INE among the
hip-hop community also began to afflict Ximbo and Danger vicariously.
Concluding remarks: the affects of democratization
In ‘Towards An Aesthetic Of Popular Music’, Frith (1987, p. 46) sought to move
‘from a description of music’s social functions to an understanding of how we
can and do value it’. I seek to accomplish something similar, here, by articu-
lating the value of campaign song to questions of political trust; by showing
how campaign song invoked, and built upon, discrete affective literacies
encoded in the affordances of popular music – figuring democratization as
variously universal, transnational, and singular, or as open-ended, multiple,
and heterospecific.
This article looks to write Mexican campaign song into democratic partici-
pation by exploring political authentication on two levels: personal and sys-
temic. Both imbricate music in the processes of electoral politics, seeking to
include new political publics by articulating diverse entertainment cultures to
‘the requirements of political citizenship’ (van Zoonen 2005, p. 15). In the first,
music is a vicarious proving-ground for a political candidate’s honesty, and
thus the veracity of this candidate’s claims. The perceived authenticity of
the musician and that of the candidate are placed into a mutually defining
relationship. Democratic citizenship is thus figured as a deeply affectionate
endeavour (cf. Stokes 2010, p. 105). In the second, music acts as a means
of civic education, facilitating voters to assess the claims made by political
candidates. It seeks to engage voters through exposure to information; yet
it may come at the expense of more critical, partisan, and less self-avowedly
‘neutral’ forms of engaging voters with electoral politics. Each of these forms
of political authentication advances different diagnoses of the problem of low
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trust in Mexico’s political system: one roots this problem in personalities, and
another sees it as the product of a lack of societally aggregated political
knowledge. They also have distinct implications for musical expression, as
the analysis presented above has shown; the genre-specific musical affor-
dances they exploit can differ dramatically.
Nonetheless, this analysis also reveals the mutual imbrication of personal
and systemic authentication, observing the unpredictable personal conse-
quences of engaging musically in a mistrusted electoral system. The pro-
duction of campaign song is embedded in an economic system in which
survival as a professional musician is exceptionally challenging. In this
context ‘authenticity’ is often understood as something achieved, more a
product of hard work than of musicians’ moral purity. Throughout these
experiences, authentication exceeds musicians’ control; trust was related to
narratives of political corruption, which limited the possibilities for musically
and artistically narrating politicians’ trustworthiness. Authentication emerges
as a collaborative task shared between musicians, political figures, and
publics. Given such unpredictability, it is no surprise that public relations
companies’ main strategy to control their musical output’s post-election
meaning is comparatively crude: they delete these songs from social net-
works. Clearly, the interests of these ‘hidden musicians’ themselves are side-
lined through many of the ways that their music is mediated.
This analysis leaves plenty to discover about what is a largely opaque
musical culture. More research needs to be carried out regarding the
musical cultures of elections in general, especially in global perspective. In
particular, the analysis presented here is carried out with producers rather
than consumers of campaign song; it therefore cannot address the extent
to which campaign songs may have affected voter choice. The approach pre-
sented here does, however, help to respond to disparaging domestic com-
mentary about election song, and to the questions this commentary raises
concerning inclusion, exclusion, and class. On the one hand, this article
aims to write campaign song into discourse about democratization. It
shows how music is used to engage new or marginal publics in the play of
politics – either by seeking to facilitate informed public engagement in pol-
itical discourse, or by personalizing and aestheticizing it. On the other, politi-
cal authentication implies ‘inauthentic’ others – for instance, the
professionalized promotional campaigns associated with the established pol-
itical parties, or the ‘rotten’ political elite (cf. Grossberg 1992). Campaign song
thus raises questions about who gets to define the scope of democracy and
democratization.
In the wake of the election, AMLO and Morena have deepened their popu-
list affectionate rhetoric, narrating a utopian ‘Republic of Love’ in response to
conflict in Mexican society while continuing to conduct divisive politics (Han-
rahan and Aroch Fugellie 2019). It is tempting to argue that campaign music
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was involved in a certain reorientation of the political field towards personal-
ity, and away from apparently ‘disinterested’ decision-making. The use of
music as part of electoral communications may be taken straightforwardly
as a means for politicians to win at the expense of democratic functioning.
As one Mexican commentator recently argued, political campaigns are
often ‘bad for democracy’ because they ‘tend to move the more emotive
part, at times with little rationality, of their electoral base’.35 Repeatedly,
official reports on strengthening democratic political culture in Mexico
have offered no discussion of artistic media such as campaign songs in the
play of politics during elections, focusing instead on how to facilitate
‘rational’, informed decision-making in political communication (Esteinou
Madrid 2013, Caballero Álvarez 2018). In turn, marketing strategists have
tended to view campaign music as a means to stimulate ‘emotional’ over
‘rational’ decision-making.36 One public relations operative who worked on
elections told me of concern about the ways that ‘politicians from a Third
World country take popular songs and turn them into their jingles, I mean,
it’s like a resource, it’s horrible but effective’.
Nonetheless, ‘rational/emotional’ binary divisions assume a particular
paternalism when applied to campaign music in new democracies such as
Mexico, where there are substantive historical reasons for mistrust of political
institutions. In Mexico, the binary division between ‘rationality’ and its other
maps onto elite anxieties about national backwardness, in which democrati-
zation can be narrated as a civilizing or modernizing project (Lomnitz-Adler
2001, Esteinou Madrid 2013, pp. 84–87). Within this frame, campaign songs
are prone to be treated as curiosities; something other than serious political
texts.
These debates speak to a certain faultline within cultural studies itself
between championing culture and critiquing it (Puoskari 2004, pp. 168–
169); between critiques of affective politics and/as demagoguery, and open-
ness to the epistemic possibilities presented by the affective turn. Scholars
of culture have aired critiques of the limitations of the familiar ‘transnational
language of politics’ (Tadiar 2009, p. 21); critiqued the substitution of politi-
cal debate with charisma (e.g. Grossberg 1992, Lipsitz 1994, p. 152); and
aired anxieties about the implications of ‘incommensurability’ for political
deliberation (Spielman 2019). The concepts of personal and systemic
authentication explored in this article fall on different sides of this faultline;
each implies a different vision of democratic cultures, and music’s role
within them; and neither has straightforward, predictable effects or affor-
dances. Most important: in practice, personal and systemic authentication
are shown here to be thoroughly intertwined. This is seen, above, in the
ways that publics authenticate campaign song in their responses to it;
and in how personal feelings of mistrust affected an attempt to foment sys-
temic legitimacy through music.
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As Papacharissi argues, it is vital not to overlook the ways that ‘affect,
feeling, and emotion […] reflexively drive movements that express rationally
focused expressions of ideological beliefs’ (2015, p. 3). In turn, democratiza-
tion ought to be understood not as a singular process, but as open-ended,
contingent, creative, and affective. Music emerges not as an exception to pol-
itical discourse, but as an extension of the same; it reflects the patterns of
inclusion and exclusion of political campaigns. Complex entanglements are
documented here between trust, authentication, and the affective literacies
of campaign song. The affordances of campaign song offer not only a way
to win elections: they connect people with the play of politics in Mexico.
To sound the Republic of Love, in a fragile, insecure and disunified nation,
is a reasonable thing to do.
Notes
1. Interview, Perla Ramos, June 2018.
2. Campaign song may also be wrongly connected to illiteracy; in fact Mexico’s lit-
eracy rate is above 96 percent, and campaign song videos tend to be
accompanied by written lyrics.
3. Imagen Noticias, ‘Esta es la nueva canción de AMLO/Qué Importa’, 17 April
2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CE8BpkXB-A (accessed 20 May
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4. On this basis, political scientists have argued that low-trust societies create con-
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pp. 561–562).
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racy as skepticism (Cleary and Stokes 2006).
6. https://www.proceso.com.mx/537652/la-dictadura-de-la-propaganda (accessed
18 December 2018).
7. https://www.proceso.com.mx/530861/el-costo-de-la-democracia (accessed 18
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‘fake news’ about the elections, entitled Verificado 2018. Zimmerman and
Eddens (2018, p. 968) argue that the ‘rapid growth of post-truth anxieties is
[…] a classed phenomenon’; it is notable that the magazine Proceso principally
reaches a middle-class, educated audience.
8. There was a perception among AMLO’s supporters that only an overwhelming
result would force the establishment to concede; one of the most widespread
pro-AMLO slogans in 2018 was voto masivo por AMLO (‘mass vote for AMLO’). In
this way, mistrust was converted into a motivation for engagement in Mexico’s
electoral system (cf. Hooghe 2018). Indeed, even as AMLO held double-
digit leads in the polls before election day, his supporters harbored suspicions




9. Indeed, the PRI campaign song ‘Es con Meade’ (which is based on ‘This Is Me’
from the musical The Greatest Showman) contains several unsubtle visual
cues relating AMLO to the Venezuelan government and suggesting that a
Morena victory would trigger a stock market crisis: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=GCbKhb79-vo (accessed 24 December 2018).
10. During the 2018 elections the PAN and PRD entered a national-level coalition.
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(accessed 11 January 2019).
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(accessed 18 January 2019).
13. That is, within recent Mexican history: however, as Lomnitz explores, the play of
politics in Mexico has often been centered upon the presidential persona (2001,
pp. 81–109).
14. https://twitter.com/belindapop/status/1006937317410574336/video/1
(accessed 11 February 2021).
15. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNpEpkbz14E (accessed 23 December
2018).
16. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opmyIIdPlS0 (accessed 23 December
2018).
17. https://verificado.mx/falsas-facturas-que-recibio-belinda-por-apoyar-amlo/
(accessed 23 December 2018).
18. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JngtNjRKkw&t=3s (accessed 17 Decem-
ber 2018).
19. https://verificado.mx/lo-que-sabemos-de-la-nina-bien/ (accessed 17 December
2018).
20. http://www.milenio.com/espectaculos/banda-ms-deslinda-campana-favor-
amlo (accessed 18 December 2012). The YouTube video of the song has been
taken down, but it is online at https://twitter.com/CuliacanMorena/status/
951708650082463744/video/1 (accessed 19 December 2012).
21. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijUbtpI-smA (accessed 19 December 2018).
22. https://www.proceso.com.mx/539134/el-ine-reporta-gastos-de-campana-anaya-
sigue-como-lider-con-258-millones-de-pesos (accessed 1 January 2019).
23. A form of ballad popular in Mexico, typically organized into a linear narrative
with a series of literary formulae, and often containing octosyllabic lines; see
McDowell (2000).
24. A form of dance music with its origins in Colombia.
25. Hugo Ramos is erroneously credited with writing the lyrics in the YouTube
video.
26. The song is described as a huapango (a term which refers to a subgenre of son
huasteco but which is also often used interchangeably with it) on YouTube and
in an article written for Proceso by the journalist Roberto Ponce. Son huasteco is
a form of popular song from the Huasteca region of Mexico, typically featuring a
violin, jarana and huapangera as well as falsetto singing.
27. https://www.ine.mx/sobre-el-ine/ (accessed 10 January 2019).
28. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/lorenzo-cordova-vianello/nacion/hacia-
el-voto-libre (accessed 17 January 2019).
29. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/elecciones-2018/convoca-ine-defender-la-
democracia-y-combatir-las-fake-news (accessed 18 January 2019).
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30. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/lorenzo-cordova-vianello/nacion/
hacia-el-voto-libre (accessed 17 January 2019).
31. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJDllhCU0qU (accessed 8 January 2018).
Danger had a freestyle rap battle with Proof in 2017.
32. Online communication, Juan, June 2018.
33. Interview, Pedro, June 2018.
34. INE was known as the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) until 2014.
35. https://www.milenio.com/opinion/victor-reynoso/interes-publico/candidatos-
y-gobernantes (accessed 31 October 2020).
36. https://politica.expansion.mx/mexico/2018/03/10/los-jingles-politicos-que-
mueven-las-emociones-del-elector (accessed 31 October 2020).
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